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Abstract 
All people have to make risky decisions in everyday life. And 
we do not know how true they are. But is it possible to mathematically 
assess the correctness of our choice? This article discusses the model 
of decision making under risk on the example of project management. 
This is a game with two players, one of which is Investor, and the 
other is the Project Manager. Each player makes a risky decision for 
himself, based on his past experience. With the help of a mathematical 
model, the players form a level of confidence, depending on who the 
player accepts the strategy or does not accept. The project manager 
assesses the costs and compares them with the level of confidence. An 
investor evaluates past results. Also visit the case where the strategy 
of the player accepts the part. 
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1. Overview 
We will present examples of works showing that confidence in the 
events depends on experience. 
A person’s psychological state may affect performance in different 
ways. Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) [61] suggest that stress can 
impair performance. In the final exams, black and white were asked many 
difficult verbal tasks in two conditions: the first was described as diagnostic, 
which should be interpreted as an assessment of the individual, while the 
second was described as a definition of how people solved problems. Steele 
and Aronson interpret the diagnostic state as putting black subjects at risk of 
fulfilling a racial stereotype about their intellectual abilities and causing self-
doubt and concern about conformity with this stereotype. Negros manifested 
themselves more weakly when stress was induced (diagnostic condition) than 
in a neutral state. 
Aronson et al. (1999) [62] speaks of a similar effect in white-skinned 
men. When it was said before the test that there is a stereotype that Asian 
students are better than Caucasian students in mathematical abilities, these 
experienced white men passed the test much worse than students who were 
not told about it. This shows how a person’s past stories affect his self-
confidence. 
Oliver Compte and Andrew Postlevaite (2001) [64] talked about how 
the psychological state of a person could affect his performance. For example, 
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fear can lead to failure, while memories of past successes gave confidence in 
what happened. 
Simon Baker et al. (1997) [63] also consider positive and negative 
natures in humans and show that induced mood affects the subject's verbal 
fluency. In addition, they measure regional cerebral blood flow using positron 
emission tomography (PET). They find that elevated mood is associated with 
the activation of areas of the brain associated with different emotions. This 
conclusion is very interesting because it points to the obvious physiological 
effects of mood. 
2. Introduction 
A person is subject to different emotions while making a decision, 
which depends on many factors. One of them is the memory of past events. 
Bad experience can cause uncertainty in the correctness of the decision that 
would entail the rejection of this strategy. Also, there may be a reverse 
situation: success in the past encourages a person to make a decision. 
There is evidence that a person is inclined to memorize more negative 
events of his life, rather than positive ones. For example, the pain of losing a 
small amount of money will be remembered longer than the joy of winning 
this amount in the lottery. That is why this article aims to show how life 
experience influences decision making. 
One of the most illustrative examples of this problem is investing in 
projects. In this situation, a decision is made whether to invest money in a 
project or not, since there is a large share of the risk of losing the invested 
amount without having received any profit in the future. Further in the article 
we will consider the choice of an investor in the conditions of risk and draw 
up a game-theoretic model. 
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3. Formulation of the problem 
Let us analyze how the Investor forms the choice of his strategy. Let A 
denote the Investor’s strategy, which implies a contribution to the project. 
Adopting strategy A, there is both a risk and an opportunity to make a profit. 
As a rule, the greater the risk of investing, the greater the expected return. 
The question arises, what (logical, psychological) mechanism can lead 
an agent to the most effective outcome of this problem? This question remains 
one of the central in modern game theory. 
We assume that the main problem of acceptance is confidence, or rather 
its absence. Certainly, confidence can be influenced by past experience of the 
Investor: which of his investments justified themselves and which of them did 
not. 
In this model, we believe that it is the past experience that affects 
confidence, and thus the likelihood of the investor getting the maximum 
profit. 
 
Formalization of the game-theoretic model of strategy choice under 
risk conditions 
Investor strategy selection. Formation of the level of investor 
confidence. 
The beginning of the procedure for concluding a potential transaction 
will correspond to the strategy chosen by the Investor A, which will mean in 
the future that the Investor has decided to invest in the project. Let us analyze 
how the Investor forms the choice of his strategy. 
Let 𝑝0 ∈ [0,1] be the Investor's confidence level in the successful 
outcome of the choice of strategy A in a risky transaction. Let ψ0 ∈ [0,1] be 
the actual probability of a successful outcome when choosing strategy A. 
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We assume that when an Investor analyzes a decision, his level of 
confidence is based on memories of the outcomes of his past projects. 
An investor, in whose memory there are more successful investments, 
will have a higher level of confidence in the successful outcome of this 
situation. At the same time, the Investor, in whose memory there are more 
unsuccessful investments, will have a lower level of confidence in the 
successful outcome. 
Let 𝑠0 be the number of successful outcomes of strategy A in the 
memory of the Investor. And 𝑓0 is the number of negative outcomes of 
strategy A. 
We assume that the Investor confidence level is 𝑝0 = 𝛽(𝑠0, 𝑓0), where 
β satisfies the following properties: 
1) For any  𝑠0, 𝑓0  0 < 𝛽(𝑠0, 𝑓0) < 1 
2) 𝛽𝑠
′ >0, 𝛽𝑓
′ <0 (with an increase in the number of successes, 
confidence increases, and with an increase in the number of failures, 
confidence decreases)  
3) For any 𝑎 >  0, lim
𝑓→∞
𝛽(𝑎𝑓0, 𝑓0) =
𝑎
𝑎+1
 
The third property is fundamental, since it can be concluded from the 
fact that when the number of outcomes tends to infinity when choosing 
strategy A, the level of confidence tends to the empirical frequency of 
success. 
Thus, the Investor forms in the memory the number of successful and 
unsuccessful outcomes. But we cannot say that he does it objectively, since it 
was previously stated that failures are perceived more deeply and are 
remembered more strongly. Investor's perception is distorted, which will 
necessarily affect our model. Consequently, we must formalize the 
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description of the model and consider various options for the perception of the 
Investor. 
 
Model formalization. Variants of the distorted perception of the 
Investor. 
Let 𝑦0 ∈ 𝑌0 be the impulse received by the Investor, after each end of 
the project in which he invested. The investor remembers this impulse and 
records it in his past experience, which he will consider when choosing the 
strategy A. Also, let's say about the set of all possible outcomes of the 
transaction 𝑋0. 
We introduce the investor perception matrix. For each 𝑦0 ∈ 𝑌0 and 
 𝑥0 ∈ 𝑋0 we denote 𝑢𝑥0,𝑦0
0  - the probability that the momentum was 𝑦0, when 
the true outcome is  𝑥0. Since there are only two outcomes of the transaction, 
𝑋0 = {𝑆0, 𝐹0}. And also only two types of impulse 𝑌0 = {𝑛, 𝑚}, where n is 
the normal (correct) perception of the Investor, m is the false one. Let  𝛾 0 be 
the probability that the Investor assigns a negative outcome to a negative state 
of affairs. Then we can create an investor perception matrix: 
𝑢0 =  (
 
    
  𝑛 𝑚
 𝑆 0  1 0
 𝐹 0  1 −  𝛾 0   𝛾 0
  ) 
This matrix is important in order to assess the past experience of the 
Investor. 
Let the Investor can accurately count the number of successful 
investments made (sometimes the memory may not allow him to do this), for 
which  𝑥0 =  𝑠0. Next, we formalize the concept of “experience” as a pair 
 𝑤0 = ( 𝑥0, 𝑦0), as for each outcome  𝑥0 there is a momentum  𝑦0 (the 
investor responds to each outcome in a certain way, so a positive outcome is 
not always written by an investor in a positive experience). Due to the fact 
7 
 
that a person does not always assess the situation objectively, at this moment 
there is a distortion of the actual data, and, therefore, we must introduce a 
random variable such as  с0( 𝑤0,  𝑠0)={1,0}. 1 if experience  𝑤0 ∈  𝑠0 and 0 
otherwise. Thus, 𝑐0=1 if the experience that the Investor received (in his 
opinion) is related to a positive outcome. 
Let the Investor recollection process be the vector  𝑔0  =
{ 𝑔 0  
 𝜔 0  ,  𝑠 0  
} 𝜔 0  ,  𝑠 0  , where  𝑔 
0  
 𝜔 0  ,  𝑠 0  
= 𝑃{ с0( 𝑤0,  𝑠0) = 1}  (the 
probability that the random variable  с0 = 1, as the experience obtained by 
the Investor is related to a positive outcome). Let also the random variable 
 𝛿0  ( 𝑠 0  ) =   ∑ с0( 𝑤0,  𝑠0) 
 𝑤 0  ∈  𝑊   
, where W is the set of all Investor's 
experiments. 
Since the number of positive and negative outcomes deposited in 
memory for a given set of past experiments is a random variable, then   𝑠 0 =
 𝛿0(𝑆0 ),   𝑓 0 =  𝛿0(𝐹0 ). 
We can conclude that when the Investor forms the confidence level 𝑝0, 
only those outcomes that he attributed to the normal (correct) one, ie those for 
which 𝑦0 = 𝑛. 
From where, the process of remembering an investor  𝑔0  has the form: 
 𝑔 0  
 𝜔 0  ,  𝑠 0  
= 1 if   𝑥 0  =    𝑠 0   and   𝑦0 = 𝑛 
 𝑔 0  
 𝜔 0  ,  𝑠 0  
= 0  otherwise. 
Consider the frequency of positive implementations of strategy A, due 
to normal circumstances, according to Investor. This will be a function of the 
true frequency of outcomes when choosing strategy A. 
Let   𝛼 0  =  ( 𝛼   
 𝑥 0  
 0     ) 𝑥0  ∈  𝑋 0    be the true frequency of Investor 
outcomes. 
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The expected number of events when counting positive outcomes   𝑠 0  
is 
𝐸(𝑢0, 𝑔0,  𝛼 0  ) 𝛿
0  ( 𝑠 0  ) =  ∑  𝑔 0  
( 𝑥 0  ,  𝑦 0  ),  𝑠 0  
 
 
𝑥0  ∈  𝑋 0  ,  𝑦0  ∈  𝑌 0  
𝑢𝑥0,𝑦0
0    𝛼    𝑥 0  
 0      
 Thus, the Investor’s confidence level in investing 𝑝0, based on past 
experience, is expressed by the following relationship: 
𝐸
(𝑤0, 𝑔0,  𝛼 0  )
 𝛿0  ( 𝑠 0  )
𝐸(𝑤0, 𝑔0,  𝛼 0  ) 𝛿
0  ( 𝑠 0  )+ 𝐸(𝑤0, 𝑔0,  𝛼 0  ) 𝛿
0  ( 𝑓 0  )
                                   (1) 
 
Note:  
Formula (1) is an approximate calculation of Investor's confidence, 
since at any time t the number of successes in a transaction  𝑠 0  is a random 
variable. With an increase in past experience, its values will be close to the 
values of the relation (1). 
The investor’s correct adoption of the strategy A: 
In order for the investor to invest his money in the project, it is 
necessary that 
𝑝0 ≥ 𝜇, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜇 ∈ (0.5; 1] 
Now we will consider such a scenario that the Investor can invest in the 
project not all the funds, but part of them. So, for example,  
𝜇1 ∈ (0.5; 0.65] 
𝜇2 ∈ (0.65; 0.8] 
𝜇3 ∈ (0.8; 1] 
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Then if  𝜇1 ≤ 𝑝0 < 𝜇2, then the Investor invests 1/3 of the sum at his 
disposal, if 𝜇2 ≤ 𝑝0 < 𝜇3, then 2/3, and if 𝑝0 ≥ 𝜇3, then the whole amount is 
full. 
 
Choosing a strategy for a project manager. Formation of the 
confidence level of the Project Manager 
Now suppose that the Investor invests money in a project, and then the 
Investment Project Manager manages them. He will also have his strategy B: 
The manager can use the money for personal enrichment, instead of investing 
in the project. If the Manager uses money for personal enrichment, then he 
puts himself at risk of being caught by the police. Again, we ask ourselves the 
question: what is necessary for the Manager to consider in order to make a 
decision? Obviously, we must build on confidence and past experience, as is 
the case with Investor. 
Let  𝑝  1  be the Manager’s confidence level in the successful outcome 
of choosing strategy B in case of a risky decision to assign money such that 
 p 1  ∈ [0,1]. Let  ψ 01   be the actual probability of a successful outcome when 
the Manager chooses the strategy B, such that  ψ 01   : [0,1] × [0,1] → [0, 1],   
 𝜓 01   =   𝜓 ( 𝑝 0  ,  𝑝 1  )  ∈  [0,1],  𝑝  0  ∈  [0,1],   𝑝  1  ∈  [0,1] .  
Let  𝑠  1   be the number of successful outcomes of the choice of strategy 
B in the Manager’s memory, let  𝑓   1  be the number of negative outcomes of 
the choice of strategy B in the Manager’s memory. We assume that the level 
of confidence of the Manager 
 𝑝  1  = 𝛽 ( 𝑠  1  ,  𝑓   1  ) where β satisfies the following properties: 
1) for any 𝑠   1  ,  𝑓   1  ,  0 < β ( 𝑠  1  ,  𝑓   1  ) <1 
2) 𝛽1
′  >0,  𝛽2
′  <0 
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3) for any a >0, 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑓→∞ β ( 𝑎 𝑓
  1  ,  𝑓  1  ) = 
𝑎
𝑎+1
 . 
These assumptions can be viewed as the formalization of accessibility 
heuristics for the Manager. 
 
Formalization of accessibility heuristics due to distortion of the 
Manager’s perception 
 Let  𝑦 1 ∈  𝑌 1  be the Manager's impulse, which he receives after each 
decision to assign funds. That is, choosing a strategy B, each time he receives 
a signal that corresponds to the perception of his current experience and 
which will affect the perception of the outcome of the choice of this strategy 
in the Manager’s memory in the future. Let  𝑋 1   be the entire set of outcomes 
of the choice of the strategy B of the Manager. 
We introduce the Manager's perception matrix. For each 𝑦1 ∈
𝑌1 and 𝑥1 ∈ 𝑋1we denote 𝑢𝑥1,𝑦1
1  - the probability that the momentum was 𝑦1, 
when the true outcome is  𝑥1. Since there are only two outcomes of a 
transaction, 𝑋1 = {𝑆1, 𝐹1}. And also only two types of impulse  𝑌1 = {𝑛, 𝑚}, 
where n is the normal (correct) perception of the Manager, m is the false one. 
Let  𝛾 1 be the probability that the Manager assigns a negative outcome to a 
negative state of affairs. Then we can create the Manager’s perception matrix: 
𝑢1 =  (
 
    
  𝑛 𝑚
 𝑆 1  1 0
 𝐹 1  1 −  𝛾 1   𝛾 1
  ) 
For experience, we take the pair  𝑤 1  =  (  𝑥 1  ,  𝑦 1  ). Moreover, let 
1 𝑤 1  ,  𝑠 1  be a random variable that takes a value of 1 if experience  𝑤 
1  =
 (  𝑥 1  ,  𝑦 1  ) included by the Superintendent in his calculation of past 
outcomes  𝑠1  and equal to 0 otherwise. Since the Manager is not always able 
to remember all cases of previous outcomes. 
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Define a random variable  𝛿1   ( 𝑠 1  ) =  ∑ 1 𝜔 1  ,  𝑠 1   𝑤 1  ∈ 𝑊1  
The process of remembering the Manager will be called the 
probability vector 
 𝑞 1  =  { 𝑞 1   𝑤 1  ,  𝑠 1 }  𝑤 1  ,  𝑠 1 
 
Where  𝑞 1  
 𝑤 1  ,  𝑠 1 
=  𝑃{ с1( 𝑤1,  𝑠1) = 1} (the probability that the 
random variable  с1 = 1, that is, the experience gained by the Manager, is 
related to a positive outcome). 
Let   𝛼 1  =   ( 𝛼   
 𝑥 1  
 1     ) 𝑥1  ∈  𝑋 1   be the true frequency of the Manager’s 
outcomes when choosing the strategy B. 
The expected number of events when counting the number of cases of 
successful outcomes  𝑠 1   is 
𝐸(𝑢1, 𝑞1,  𝛼 1  ) 𝛿
1  ( 𝑠 1  ) =  ∑  𝑞 1  ( 𝑥 1  ,  𝑦 1  ),  𝑠 1  
 
𝑥1  ∈  𝑋 1  ,  𝑦1  ∈  𝑌 1 
𝑢𝑥1,𝑦1
1    𝛼    𝑥 1  
 1      
 
Thus, the Manager’s confidence level for the personal use of 𝑝1 based 
on past experience, is expressed by the following relationship: 
𝐸(𝑤1, 𝑞1,  𝛼 1  ) 𝛿
1  ( 𝑠 1)
𝐸(𝑤1, 𝑞1,  𝛼 1  ) 𝛿
1  ( 𝑠 1  )+ 𝐸(𝑤1, 𝑞1,  𝛼 1  ) 𝛿
1  ( 𝑓 1  )
                                   (2) 
 
Note: 
 Formula (2) is an approximate calculation of the Manager’s 
confidence, since at any time t the number of successes in using the means 
 𝑠 1  is a random variable. With an increase in past experience, its values will 
be close to the values of the relation (2). 
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Rule of adoption by the Manager 
Let the use of funds for the project by the Manager for personal 
purposes entails possible costs, the level of which we denote as h. Suppose 
that the level of costs h is a stochastic and independent value from the interval 
[0,1]. And when the Manager considers options for strategy B, he knows the 
value of h. 
If  𝑝 1  ≥ ℎ, that is, the Manager’s confidence level in the successful 
outcome is greater than the required costs, then he takes strategy B and takes 
the money. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This work is an attempt to bring agents to the effective outcome of their 
interaction. Throughout the work, we were of the opinion (in common with 
psychology) that agents form their level of confidence based on simple 
heuristics and the choice of attribution style. 
Undoubtedly, there are a large number of heuristics, psychological 
patterns and personal associations that agents use when forming their choice. 
But our main goal is not to compile an exhaustive catalog with which agents 
can form their determination, but to present a new way of optimization for the 
risk interaction between the two agents. 
The results obtained in this article show that personal perception of the 
situation, a tendency toward optimistic or pessimistic distortions of perception 
can affect the formation of a person’s confidence about his ability to succeed 
in a risky transaction. As well as the same mechanisms affect the opponent 
and how they are combined with each other. 
From the obtained results a number of conclusions follow. 
For example: 
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* if agents could find any control over their level of confidence, then 
this could lead them to improve the results of the risky deals they concluded. 
* if agents could find any control over the level of confidence of the 
opponent, then this could lead them to improve the results of risky deals they 
make. 
* Risky deals are “safer” to conclude with agents whose past 
experience is most positive. 
Thus, careful attention to oneself and one's own reactions to the 
perception of situations, to the personality of the opponent and his past 
experience, is a very important step in the intention to conclude a risky deal. 
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